Sunday, 16 August 2026

Dignity in Dying


Yesterday, I published the first half of my review of Do we Have the Right to Die? by Brenda Hale and Rowan Williams. In that post, I covered the first half of the book, authored by Lady Hale, making the case for assisted suicide, though being at best (and with a following wind) lukewarm over the proposed Leadbeater legislation, which she has since spoken more clearly about disliking. Today, I look at the second half of the book, where Lord Williams makes his case against the legislation in principle.

Book cover

Lord Williams characteristically begins by seeking to stake out some shared ground. He wants each side to be able to recognise that the other’s position is grounded in moral concern for the human person. He seems, though, rather to assume that some form of legislation in favour of assisted suicide will be passed, as he hopes that “any legislative outcome might try to retain some measure of recognition for those whose view has not prevailed but who remain part of the same society”. (p.84-5) It is hard to see how this can be the case without some form of assisted suicide being made legal, but with protection for the consciences of those who oppose it.

As part of this clearing of the decks, he also addresses the validity of religious argument in the light, particularly, of Esther Rantzen’s attempt to use religious conviction as a way of smearing her opponents’ arguments as made in bad faith. People root their arguments in their deepest convictions. However, in public debate about policy, they need to find arguments which persuade those who do not share those convictions. This is not bad faith, but the inevitable consequence of democratic debate in a pluralist society. “it is an attempt to find some common ground about the common good.” (p.90) He also notes that people such as his predecessor at Canterbury, Lady Hale, and Rabbi Jonathan Romain argue in favour of assisted suicide with (and in varying degrees from) their religious conviction.

Decks sufficiently cleared, the bishop moves on to discuss rights. Here he seeks to untangle some of the complexities of the “right to die”. This language is used in equivocal ways: he uses the examples of the right not to be enslaved, and the right to work. Law can ensure the first, it cannot command the economy. Governments do, in wartime or national emergency, constrain individual rights in favour of collective security though the limits and nature of those powers might be disputed. (He could give rather more weight to the dispute than he does.) Here also, he appears more in agreement with his sparring partner. What is it about having perhaps six months to live that confers the right to die, but having another kind of painful, life-limiting and irreversible condition does not confer that right? And (an argument repeated by many of the campaigners against this legislation) how does a society balance the rights of one individual to exercise their autonomous mental capacity to make such a decision against the protection of vulnerable groups who lack the ability so to do.

Bishop Williams moves from rights to risks. He notes that risk is recognised in the legislation itself; why else have safeguards? He takes Kim Leadbeater’s assurance that the bill is rigorous in this to be made in good faith but draws attention to the many groups including palliative care, psychiatric and disability specialist service who (to put it mildly) dispute this. He comes as close as he ever gets to a “j’accuse” moment against the organisation Dignity in Dying when he skewers their campaign for making the “ideal” case (the autonomous capable rational adult making a decision in face of an intolerable but short future with the full and unanimous support of friends and family) the “usual” one. How much is the abusive relationship, the controlling partner, the pressure of poverty, and family division glossed over in this marketing move? (I make explicit the sharper case hidden under his more emollient subclauses.) He ends this section with a question over the risks posed to the limited and stretched resources of the healthcare system.

Next, the bishop explores the question of priorities. The larger part of this argument concerns the cost of healthcare, and the lack of consistent palliative care. Good palliative care is something of a postcode lottery. There are those voices (the commentator Matthew Parris is one such, the MP Kit Malthouse seems to be another) who see noting wrong with triaging the dying in order to spend limited resources more effectively on those who might be expected to recover. Lord Williams – frustratingly in my view – does not address the ethics of this directly, but prefers to continue by indirect questioning. He draws attention to the way disability groups are overwhelmingly against the bill, and evidence from Canada and Oregon that poverty may play a part in encouraging or pressuring people to choose death. From these and others, he asks whether this provision encourages a society in which some lives are effectively less valuable than others.

As the final part of his argument, he turns to the slippery slope that Lady Hale seemed quite happy to slide down. He suggests there are both legitimate and illegitimate versions of this, and that, for him, a legitimate version is one where there are further steps that can (and possibly should) be taken arising from the same basic principle. If the principle is personal autonomy, why should it not extend to far more contexts? If the principle is the compassionate relief of intolerable suffering, why should it stop at physical suffering? And if both principles be combined, does seeking to prevent someone’s suicide become a violation of their human rights? At the end, he remains doubtful of framing this in terms of a right, even while he recognises it might be a freedom. The language of my right entails someone else’s responsibility. Can someone impose on a family member, a doctor, or even society, the duty to kill them, or even help them kill themselves?

The bishop seeks to draw all this together, first by returning to what he sees as a key point: if we are to change the law to aid a certain number of people (those who have less than six months to live and whose suffering is intolerable to them) we must be sure that change does not introduce worse consequences for other people (pressure on the poor to end their lives because they cannot afford the care they need to make them tolerable).

Seeking a dialectical approach as always, Lord Williams then seeks to establish what he hopes might be common ground between the opposed sides. “If there is to be a choice,” he says, “let it be a fair one in which palliative options are both taken with full seriousness and given full support.” (p.147 - given some of the stances taken by Lord Falconer and Kit Malthouse this seems generous to a fault!) His second point is the most interesting: that there is a genuine recognition on all sides that there is such thing as a good death. What might come of exploring this further? He tentatively advances a third, the idea that death is not the worst thing imaginable in a human life, though the grounds on which such a view is held might differ wildly.

It is with this last point that I register my own disappointment with Bishop Rowan’s argument. While Lady Hale was prepared to assert a poor theological argument for her view, Lord Williams offers none, weak or strong. True, he has earlier stated that he is seeking arguments that might persuade those who do not share his first principles, but I think he could do more to set out what those principles are, and why a theological vision of human dignity might be compelling. The church has a long pastoral and spiritual tradition of what a good death is, and how the last enemy can be befriended by those who recognise it has already been defeated. Perhaps a profound, poetic and culturally relevant articulation of that tradition might in itself have some persuading power, and might also demonstrate that this is not simply about legal and medical calculus, but about differing visions of humanity.

That said, both Lady Hale and Lord Williams offer thoughtful and careful statements of their respective cases, with courtesy and fairness to those they disagree with, and if more did the same, this debate could be considerably better. I do, however, think the format of the book would have been considerably improved if each had been allowed a short response to the other. Perhaps if each had been asked to identify the single strongest, and the two weakest, points the other has made, it would have helped clarify matters, enhance the sense of debate, and further stimulate the reader’s thinking.

For those who would like to see them debate each other, then this interview is well worth watching.

Saturday, 15 August 2026

Dying with Dignity

A review of Hale and Williams Do we Have the right to Die?

I’ve been intending to get back into thinking aloud in this forum (and I’m going to copy this over at my Substack, until I decide which platform I prefer to use). It looks as though we’re going to go through the whole assisted suicide debate again in the next parliamentary session, and so I want to take some time to think this through by way of a review of Do we Have the Right to Die? by Brenda Hale and Rowan Williams. This will be in two parts, with this first part focussing mainly on Lady Hale’s contribution.

I’m a fan of civilized conversation and courteous disagreement, and was pleased to come across this book. It’s especially valuable as it looks as though we’re shortly to be repeating the attempt to shove a Private Member’s Bill through Parliament. Last time was bad-tempered enough, and each side accused the other of bad faith as well as bad arguments. The early signs are that this time round it will be worse, and arguably not a debate at all. I decided I would try to get my thoughts in some order by way of reviewing the book.

A couple of preliminaries. There can’t be many people who approach this without having a view themselves. Many approach the subject after encountering either good or bad end-of-life care; views can be strongly held, having been shaped by profound experiences. Let me note my own. First, my view grows strongly out of my Christian conviction that a human life is of infinite value, that life is fundamentally gift, and that death is not the end. This is no more and no less a faith based argument than those who argue from a conviction that the ultimate value is personal autonomy and freedom. None of us stand in a value-neutral space.

Second, my views are shaped by my experience of sitting with dying people, in home, hospital and hospice, and that process of accompaniment has been varied. Dying people approach their death in varying ways and at different paces. Some are readier than others; there is a spectrum between resisting and embracing it. There is no obvious or simple correlation between pain and readiness to die. I have not seen someone going through a prolonged (as opposed to occasional) period of pain that has not been able to be managed well by medication. That doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen, just that it lies outside my experience, and the testimony of hospice staff seems to be that it is rare.

Baroness Hale’s argument provides the first half of the book. In her preliminaries, she notes that three articles from the European Convention on Human Rights (currently incorporated into British Law through the 1998 Human Rights Act) are relevant to court hearings on this topic. These are 2, the right to life, 3, the prohibition of torture, and 8, the right to privacy and family life. It is this last the features most significantly in her argument. She does not particularly argue why assisted dying or assisted suicide are covered by article 8, it is more that she finds it self-evident. 

Noting the cases of Paul Lamb and Tony Nicklinson, she reveals that she is in a minority of two among the nine Supreme Court justices in thinking that the ban on assisted suicide is incompatible with article 8. It would have been good to hear this argued rather than stated. There is a certain polemic among conservatives, initially fed by Roe v Wade, that the right to privacy has been used by what they would label “activist judges”. The US situation doesn’t pertain in this country, but the rhetoric around it can still fuel conspiracy theories about judicial activism from those who don’t like applications or interpretations of law that go against their convictions.

Lady Hale proceeds through a review of a number of such difficult cases from this century, and sums up the present state of the law in England and Wales. There are two forms of dying where the law does not allow individuals to exercise personal choice and freedom. (Personal freedom and autonomy seems to be her guiding star.) As she puts it:

“We are not free to have others help us to bring our lives to an end. 
We are not free to have others bring our lives to an end.” p.36 

By contrast, she rightly notes that we are free to refuse treatment, we are free to give a proxy the right to receive treatment on our behalf, and we are free to end our own lives. I would add that allowing someone to die by not intervening (ventilation, forced feeding etc) is a different moral, as well as legal, category. 

She then turns to the case of Canada, on the grounds that their law used to be similar to ours. I find this a brave decision: of all the places that have changed the law to allow assisted dying, Oregon (which she doesn’t look at) comes closest to refuting the slippery slope argument of opponents. Canada exemplifies the slippery slope, but that doesn’t seem to trouble her unduly, even while she notes the ways the law is being both expanded and challenged. “Difficult though it is to get the answers right first time, we could do well to learn from their example.” (p.47) The problem is, every wrong answer may be a person killed who, perhaps, should not have been. The appeals process can’t undo that.

Next, she turns to public opinion and notes how it has been shifting over time, meaning that the question (before Parliament as she writes) is being asked in a different context. That does lend support to those campaigning for this change, and shows how much of an uphill struggle those of us against it face. Nonetheless, I can’t help wonder how many of those who cite public opinion on this, would bitterly oppose the same public opinion on the death penalty.

Baroness Hale deals surprisingly briefly with the underlying issues, perhaps because for her it is self-evident that an adult with mental capacity has the right to do what they want with their own body including killing themselves. She hints at the possibility of exceptions when she talks about preventing someone jumping off a bridge, but doesn’t explore them sufficiently. (I assume she would have agreed with the German courts that Bernd Brandes’ right to choose to be eaten didn’t absolve his cannibalistic killer of murder.)

It is disagreement over this question of the limits of personal autonomy that lies at the heart of the debate, and it is at best disingenuous that she outs herself as a Christian in order to co-opt the example of Jesus choosing the cross in favour of her argument. Being willing to die to save others (the conventional Christian understanding of the cross) is a different ethical and legal category, as countless memorials up and down the country testify. And, of course, for those who don’t share the Christian understanding of this, he was either a mistaken martyr, or an unwilling victim of an oppressive imperial state. Perhaps, as well as asking the humanist leader Andrew Copson to check her argument, she should have consulted more widely.

For the rest of her essay, Lady Hale looks at the practicalities of the legislation. Here she makes a number of helpful and clarifying points in relation to what a good bill might need to deal with. It becomes clear that she would prefer a bill in which eligibility is more widely drawn. The cases with which she began were mainly about the intolerability of long-term, and degenerative conditions which this once and future bill would fail to address. One point I hadn’t appreciated (and I suspect I’m far from alone in this) is that the clause providing that “no person is under any duty to participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act” (p.73) would normally be interpreted in the courts as including legal persons — thereby allowing charities like hospices, to refuse to offer assisted suicide.

She also suggests that judicial safeguards would be better handled by the local judges who serve in the court of protection, the family courts, and mental health tribunals – an option that makes more sense to me than the proposals in the Leadbetter bill. In general, she discusses issues, rather than coming to a settled view on them. I think, though, that she underestimates the ability of families and others to exercise soft power and to gaslight when she explores how one legislates against coercion. 

Interestingly, in the end, she is clearly in favour of the principle, but can’t make up her mind whether she would want to vote for such a limited bill with what she sees as “elaborate and time-consuming safeguards” (p.79). I suspect this is also the true view of many of the bill’s supporters. This is not the bill they want, and if they do vote for it, it will be as a first step in getting the principle enshrined in law. At least Lady Hale has said the quiet part out loud.

Dignity in Dying

Yesterday, I published the first half of my review of Do we Have the Right to Die? by Brenda Hale and Rowan Williams. In that post, I cove...